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INTRODUCTION: THE VEXED ISSUE OF SPATIAL ECONOMIC 
IMBALANCE IN THE UK 
 
 Stimulated by the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the Great 
Recession that this triggered, the notion of ‘rebalancing the economy’ has risen 
to prominence in UK policy discourse. An important element of this new 
‘rebalancing’ mantra is a concern that the national economy has become too 
dependent on and dominated by London and the South East, whilst the rest of 
the country is performing below its potential.1  As Prime Minister David 
Cameron noted upon assuming office in 2010:  
 
Our economy has become more and more unbalanced, with our fortunes 
hitched to a few industries in one corner of the country, while we let other 
sectors like manufacturing slide. Today our economy is heavily reliant on 
just a few industries and a few regions – particularly London and the South 
East.  This really matters. An economy with such a narrow foundation for 
growth is fundamentally unstable and wasteful – because we are not making 
use of the talent out there in all parts of our United Kingdom. We are 
determined that should change (David Cameron, Prime Minister, 2010). 
 
 Part of the Government’s policy is the aim to promote a ‘northern 
powerhouse’ to rival London and the South East in scale and scope: 
 
The cities of the north are individually strong, but collectively not strong 
enough. The whole is less than the sum of its parts. So the powerhouse of 
London dominates more and more. And that’s not healthy for our economy... 
We need a Northern Powerhouse too. Not one city, but a collection of 
northern cities - sufficiently close to each other that combined can take on 
the world (George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2014). 
 However, the UK Government is also anxious that the growth of London is 
not hindered or compromised in any way.  As a recent UK Treasury statement 
put it: 
 
Successful rebalancing will not be achieved by pulling down the capital 
city, but by building up the Northern Powerhouse and creating strong city 
regions, led by powerful, democratically elected mayors, that benefit from 
investment in world-class transport and have the support they need to 
foster innovation (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 70). 
 
Herein lies a key conundrum: how to achieve a greater degree of ‘spatial balance’ 
in the economy whilst also wanting to protect and enhance the gains from spatial 
agglomeration of economic activity and growth in the already prosperous 
                                                        
1 The issue of spatial economic rebalancing is not unique to the UK, of course. It has become a 
topic of academic and political concern in several other countries - from China to Chile to the 
European Union - where uneven regional development pose problems for economic, financial 
and social stability.  
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London-South East region.  Much of the debate surrounding this issue has 
revolved around a stark question: ‘is London good or bad for the rest of the UK’? 
On the one side are those who point to the benefits of the Greater London 
economic machine in generating demand for goods and services in the rest of the 
UK, as a vital source of export earnings, and as a major contributor to the taxes 
needed to help fund welfare payments and public spending across the nation as a 
whole (see, for example, City of London Corporation, 2011, 2014). On the other 
side are those who see London as akin to a ‘country apart’, even a quasi-
independent ‘city-state’, and a region which has become increasingly detached 
from the rest of the UK in terms of its level of prosperity, its economic growth, its 
global orientation, and its cyclical behaviour (Deutsche Bank, 2013).  Some go 
further, and regard it as having become a sort of ‘economic black hole’, sucking in 
key human and financial resources from, and to the detriment of, the rest of the 
UK. Indeed, as Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
under the Coalition Government of 2010-2015, ventured:  
 
One of the big problems that we have at the moment…  is that London is 
becoming a kind of giant suction machine, draining the life out of the rest 
of the country (Cable, 2013).    
 
A similar view was subsequently voiced by Scotland’s First Minister: 
 
London has a centrifugal pull on talent, investment and business from the 
rest of Europe and the world. That brings benefits to the broader UK 
economy. But as we know, that same centrifugal pull is felt by the rest of 
us across the UK, often to our detriment. The challenge for us all is how to 
balance this in our best interests (Nicola Sturgeon, 2014).  
 
 But this concern over an economy tipped too far towards London is 
actually nothing new (see Martin, 2015).  We have been here before, repeatedly. 
As early as 1919, the famous geographer (and Unionist MP) Halford Mackinder 
had argued for a more ‘balanced’ national socio-economy: 
 
As long as you allow a great metropolis to drain most of the best young 
brains from the local communities, to cite only one aspect of what goes on, 
so long must organizations centre unduly in the metropolis and become 
inevitably an organization of nation-wide classes and interests 
(Mackinder, 1919, p. 241). 
 
And in equally emphatic terms, the milestone Barlow Commission report in 1940 
on the distribution of the nation’s industrial population expressed a similar view, 
again in language highly prescient of that used by Vince Cable nearly seventy-five 
years later: 
 
The contribution in one area of such a large proportion of the 
national population as is contained in Greater London, and the 
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attraction to the Metropolis of the best industrial, financial, 
commercial and general ability, represents a serious drain on the 
rest of the country (Barlow Commission, 1940, para. 171).  
 
 What is clear is that the problem and pattern of uneven regional 
development – of spatial economic imbalance – in the UK economy is a deeply 
entrenched and persistent feature, going back to the Victorian era if not earlier 
(Table 1).  
 
Table 1:  Spatial Imbalance in the British Economy, 1871-2001:  
Regional GDP per Capita Relative to the Great Britain Average (GB=100) 
 
GB=100 1871 1911 1971 1981 
London 147.3 165.6 123.4 126.0 
South East 88.5 124.6 104.6 108.4 
East Anglia 97.0 76.8 92.8 94.7 
South West 88.6 85.7 93.9 91.8 
East Midlands 106.2 90.6 95.7 95.6 
West Midlands 84.8 78.4 101.9 95.6 
Yorks-Humberside 91.3 76.2 92.5 90.2 
North West 106.0 97.2 95.3 92.9 
North  94.1 89.5 86.1 92.2 
Wales 87.7 90.1 87.5 82.0 
Scotland 89.9 102.1 92.2 94.8 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 17.7 24.9 10.5 11.6 
Source of Data: Crafts (2005). Northern Ireland is omitted due to lack of consistent comparable 
historical data. The estimates refer to the old ‘Standard Regions’, and are derived mainly from 
individual tax returns, and hence are essentially residence based. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Annual Percentage Point Growth Gaps I Gross Value Added 
(2011 prices): The South, London and the North, 1971-2013 
 
 
Note: Cumulative growth gap measured as regional rate of growth minus UK rate of growth each 
year, and summed over time. The methodology is that used by Blanchard and Katz (1992) in their 
seminal study of regional economic evolutions in the United States. The ‘South’ is defined as: 
London, the South East, South West, East of England and East Midlands. The ‘North’ comprises the 
West Midlands, Yorkshire-Humberside, North East, North West, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. 
Source of Data: Cambridge Econometrics, UK Regional Economic Data Base 
 
While the scale of the problem did seem to lessen somewhat over the course of 
the post-war period up to the mid-1970s, it has never really disappeared, and 
has resurfaced with a vengeance over the past twenty years. London and the 
South of England have grown much faster than the rest of nation (Martin, 2004; 
Rowthorn, 2010; Figure 1), and have pulled progressively ahead in terms of GDP 
per capita (Table 2).  The UK now has one of the highest levels of spatial 
economic disparity of any of the major West European countries (Table 3).   
 
The problem of spatial economic imbalance has thus been a long-standing 
one in the UK and one to which the Government has given varying attention over 
the years.  Numerous different initiatives have been applied for nearly nine 
decades, and while during the post-war ‘long boom’ (roughly 1950-1975) 
regional policy reduced the degree of spatial imbalance compared to what it 
might otherwise have been, as a whole past policies have failed to have any 
lasting impact. The next section considers why past policies have proved 
disappointing. 
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Table 2:  Spatial Imbalance in the UK Economy, 1988-2013:  
Regional GDP per Capita Relative to the UK Average (UK=100) 
  UK=100 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
 
2013 
London 152 149 152 162 169 172 
South East 102 102 106 108 109 110 
East of England 97 95 99 100 97 94 
South West 93 92 89 92 92 91 
East Midlands 97 94 93 90 88 83 
West Midlands 93 92 93 88 85 83 
Yorks-Humberside 91 90 89 87 84 81 
North West 92 91 89 87 86 85 
North East  85 86 80 78     76     74 
Wales 85 84 79 76 72 72 
Scotland 99 101 96 94 96 94 
N Ireland 75 79 81 79 79 77 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 18.8 17.8 19.5 22.9 25.5 26.9 
Source of Data: Office for National Statistics. The currently used Government Office regions in 
this table differ slightly from the former old Standard Regions shown in Table 1, and also include 
Northern Ireland. The data are also workplace based, rather than residence based. 
 
 
Table 3:  Spatial Imbalance in Selected EU Countries: Coefficient of Variation in 
Regional GDP per Capita, (PPS, NUTS2 Regions) 
 
Coefficient of  
Variation (%) 
1980 2001 2011 
 
United Kingdom 0.31 0.36 0.45 
Belgium 0.43 0.44 0.37 
Germany 0.35 0.23 0.23 
Italy 0.32 0.28 0.22 
Netherlands 0.17 0.20 0.21 
France 0.15 0.18 0.19 
Spain 0.14 0.19 0.15 
Greece 0.35 0.21 0.14 
EU-15 0.32 0.28 0.33 
 
Source of Data: Cambridge Econometrics, European Regional Data Base 
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THE LIMITED IMPACT OF PAST UK REGIONAL POLICIES  
 
 Since the 1920s, successive UK governments have pursued regional and 
urban policies of various kinds aimed at reducing spatial disparities in economic 
prosperity and performance across the country.2  The first main political 
experiment was the Industrial Transference Act (1928), which was designed to 
diffuse social unrest in the areas of structurally declining coalmining and heavy 
industry of northern England, central Scotland and South Wales, by encouraging 
the unemployed in these areas to move to jobs and training schemes in the south 
and east of England.  This ‘taking workers to the work’ scheme had a limited 
impact, however, and by 1932 was in decline.  Its successor, the Special Areas Act 
of 1934, took a different approach of providing government built industrial 
premises and grants in the depressed areas to encourage local investment and 
jobs there, in effect a ‘taking work to the workers’ policy. Although this new 
experiment was a response to the problem in the ‘special areas’, it was 
overshadowed by a government concern, echoed by leading economists of the 
day, to provide a general economy-wide stimulus to ensure sustained recovery 
from the Great Depression (see Parsons 1986).   Indeed, John Maynard Keynes 
argued that the ‘central problem’ was one of general prosperity, and the 
difficulties of the depressed areas were best solved by increased economic 
activity and demand in the prosperous parts of the country rather than 
investment directed towards the depressed areas themselves.  His General 
Theory (1936) singularly failed to consider that a national multiplier effect would 
not necessarily lead to recovery and economic renewal in the depressed regions.  
Only a year after, however, though mainly in light of the growing pressures on 
southern industries of the country’s rearmament programme, he recognised that 
the economy had by then reached a stage in which a general stimulus was no 
longer enough, and that the country was more in need of “a rightly distributed 
demand than of greater aggregate demand” and that “to remedy the condition of 
the distressed areas ad hoc measures are necessary” (1937, pp. 13-14).  
 
 Modern British regional policy really began in 1945. Infused with ideas 
and imperatives forged in the Second World War related to the centralizing 
tendencies and exigencies of a war-time economy, the goals of post-war 
reconstruction, the notions of a ‘balanced distribution of industry’ found in the 
Barlow Commission’s Report, and a new commitment to town and country 
                                                        
2 Space does not permit a detailed historical exegesis and evaluation of British regional policy 
here, and what follows is intended simply to point up the main continuities and shifts in policy 
that have occurred over the past ninety years.  The key message we want to convey is that 
despite this long development, and the different variants policies have assumed over this time, 
their overall impact on spatially rebalancing the economy was relatively limited.  
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planning, the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act set the broad framework and 
orientation of a regional policy model that was to last more or less intact for the 
next 35 years. Based on a combination of constraints and controls on 
manufacturing and then also services-based office growth in London and the 
South East, combined with a series of capital grants in the designated depressed 
areas of the country, the aim was to divert economic activity and jobs from the 
former to the latter.  This approach was applied extensively over the period 1960 
to 1981, and it has been estimated that regional policy added an extra 630,000 
additional jobs as at 1981 to the economies of the Development Areas (Moore, 
Rhodes and Tyler, 1986), though a not insignificant number of those jobs were in 
branch plants of UK companies based elsewhere in the country or of foreign 
multinationals. However, by the end of the 1970s deindustrialisation had firmly 
set in, the supply of ‘footloose’ manufacturing investment was drying up, and the 
regions of the country defined as depressed and in need of government 
assistance had steadily grown and spread outwards and southwards from the 
original areas designated in 1945 to embrace some 42 percent of the nation’s 
working population, itself an indication that regional economic disparities were 
beginning to widen once again (see Table 1) 
 
 Over the ensuing two decades (and especially under the three successive 
Thatcher governments) this post-war regional policy model was progressively 
downgraded. The regional policy map was rolled back geographically (to 24 
percent of the working population) and made much more spatially fragmented, 
policy became much more discretionary, and the funding committed to it was 
reduced significantly.3 Another shift in policy came in 1997 with the election of 
the first of the New Labour governments.  A new, ‘third-generation’ regional 
policy model was forged on the argument that the best approach to fostering 
growth in all of the regions – not just the lagging northern regions but also the 
more prosperous regions of the south and east, including London – was to focus 
on building and releasing the ‘endogenous’ potential of all such areas, using new 
Regional Development Agencies as the key institutions by which to achieve this 
goal.4   Spending was increased, to about £2billion a year, and by the time that 
New Labour was ousted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrats Coalition 
                                                        
3 The retrenchment in spending on regional policy actually began in 1976, as part of public 
spending cuts imposed by the then Labour Government in response to conditions imposed by the 
IMF in return for its financial support to the UK economy to enable it to avoid a national currency 
crisis. The cuts were continued under the Thatcher administration that followed in 1979. 
4 The term used was ‘endogenous’, and indeed more than once appeal was made by the 
Government to its commitment to that branch of economics known as ‘endogenous growth 
theory’. But the policy was as much, if more, about charging the Regional Development Agencies 
to develop and harness the indigenous resources of the regions, hence the claim that this new, 
‘third generation’ regional policy model was to be ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top down’ (Balls, 
Healey and Koester, 2003).  
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Government in 2010, a whole raft of measures (from promoting clusters to 
labour force skills development) had been handed down to the RDAs. 
 
 Opinions as to the impact of the RDAs differed, but in any case no sooner 
had the Coalition Government been elected than it set about abolishing them, on 
the grounds that they had proved ineffective, had actually ‘distorted market 
forces’, and in any case bore no relationship to meaningful functional economic 
areas, though little hard evidence was invoked to support any of these criticisms 
(Pike et al. 2014).  What has followed since between 2010-15 has been an 
emerging shift to various form of ‘economic localism’, as evinced in a ‘local 
growth agenda’ (BIS, 2010), new Local Enterprise Partnerships (no more 
functionally meaningful than the RDAs these have replaced), Enterprise Zones, a 
variety of City Deals, and the beginnings of an experiment in limited city-region 
based devolution and pan-city-regional co-operation, most notably the 
‘powerhouse’ concept championed by the Chancellor the Exchequer principally 
in northern England but now emerging in the midlands and south west too. We 
want to discuss these initiatives, and to argue for being far more radical in 
approaching the problem of spatial economic balance, below.  The reason for 
making such an argument is that, despite nearly ninety years of regional policy 
interventions, substantial regional disparities in economic prosperity remain 
have in fact widened to reach levels not seen since the inter-war years.  Past 
efforts to achieve a more spatially balanced distribution of economic activity and 
economic growth have failed to have any substantial or lasting impact. Why is 
this?  Three possible explanations might be offered.  
 
First, while the funds committed to regional policy measures over the 
years have certainly not been trivial, it could be argued that the total spend has 
simply not been enough to achieve the results desired. At its height of about 
£2billion in 1976, just before the then Labour Government was forced drastically 
to cut public spending in the wake of the financial turmoil and IMF loan, 
expenditure on regional aid amounted to no more than about 1.5% of GDP.  Such 
sums were destined only to have a marginal impact on renewing the economies 
of Britain’s northern regions and cities, and at best slowed down the pace of 
relative decline of these areas. In the same vein, the level of resources that began 
to be committed to help with the regeneration of the large old Northern cities 
from the 1980s onwards tended to be relatively small in relation to the nature of 
the problem being addressed and, moreover, some of monies went to help 
regenerate London and in particular the Docklands.  
 
 A second argument is that the problem was not so much that the funds 
spent on regional assistance and aid were not significant but that they were 
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dwarfed by other forms of government expenditure – on defence, public 
procurement, gross fixed capital formation in the public corporations, 
infrastructure and the like – the geographical distribution of which tended to 
favour the more economically dynamic south of Britain.  In effect, the great bulk 
of public expenditure acted as a form of what Michael Heseltine (as a member of 
the Thatcher Government) in the mid-1980s described as ‘counter-regional 
policy’, working disproportionately to the benefit of the already prosperous 
areas in the south, helping to stimulate growth there still further.  In 1988/89, 
for example, spending on regional preferential assistance amounted to a mere 
£617 million, while government spending on defence, fixed capital formation, 
general industry support, labour market programmes, and public procurement 
totalled more than £24billion (see Martin, 1993).  The prosperous South East 
alone attracted half of national defence spending, seven times the spend on 
regional policy aid in that year.  Although the North, Wales and Scotland – the 
main assisted regions at this time – received more from defence spending than in 
official regional policy aid, the amount received was still only a third of that 
going to the South East. During these same years, the state was privatising large 
sections of certain public industries (such as coal and steel), most of which were 
concentrated in the depressed regions, deepening the deindustrialization in 
these areas (see Hudson, 1986).  Over the post-war period, then, ‘non-regional’ 
government expenditures have been vast compared to the sums devoted to 
official regional policy. These expenditures have had far-reaching direct and 
indirect effects on the productive capacity and efficiency of the regions. But these 
effects have been highly differentiated across the country, and in many respects 
have operated as counter-regional rebalancing policies, favouring the more 
prosperous South against the North.   
 
A third reason why regional policies have had such limited purchase on 
spatially rebalancing the national economy lies in the nature and geographical 
articulation of the UK’s system of national political economy. At stake here is the 
very diagnosis of the country’s problem of spatial economic imbalance.  During 
the inter-war years, and throughout much of the post-war period, up until the 
beginning of the 1980s, the problem was deemed to be structural in nature, a 
lack of demand for the products and exports of the depressed areas of northern 
Britain, encumbered as these regions were with old industries faced by more 
efficient and cheaper competitors elsewhere (often overseas).  In short, much of 
northern Britain had the wrong industries.  From the 1980s onwards, the 
diagnosis shifted away from structural obsolescence to supply-side type 
explanations, in which the slow growth of the depressed North was attributed to 
a lack of enterprise, innovation and skills, and to labour market inflexibilities.  No 
doubt elements of each explanation may have had a disproportionate impact on 
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northern cities and regions relative to their southern counterparts, but in each 
case the reasons for these weaknesses have resided in deeper more fundamental 
and systemic features of the political and institutional landscape of the country, 
in the geographical fabric of economic governance.  
 
 
THE CASE FOR A NEW SPATIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
The argument that the concentration of economic activity, growth and 
prosperity in London and the South East is merely testament to the ‘natural 
workings’ of market-driven agglomeration tends to miss an important point.  
While few would deny the role and benefits of economic agglomeration, this 
fundamental mechanism does not take place in a political-institutional vacuum.  
To the contrary, it is shaped by the form, operation and spatial organisation of 
the nation’s core institutions, governance structures, political arrangements and 
policy-making machinery.  And in the UK, these structures have themselves 
become progressively concentrated in London and its environs.  This has been a 
long and highly path dependent process.  As the historical seat of national 
government, the early location of the nation’s key financial institutions (the 
Treasury, the Bank of England, Stock Exchange, Lloyd’s Insurance), and its 
attraction of corporate headquarters, London has long dominated the nation’s 
key institutions and the outlook of the elites within them.  Time was when 
Britain had a local and regional banking system, a network of local stock 
exchanges in addition to the London market, distributed across some 22 cities, a 
system of local government municipal finance in which the majority of funds 
were raised and spent locally, a press system based in the country’s major cities, 
and so on.   One by one, these organizations and structures have become 
rationalized, centralized and controlled from London. Often with explicit or 
implicit state involvement.   
 
The self-reinforcing spatial ‘agglomeration’ and interaction of these 
institutions, from the political, to the financial, to the corporate, to the media, has 
cemented over time a highly London-centric view of the ‘national’ economic 
interest – precisely what Mackinder (op cit) expressed concern over.  The 
unquestioned conventional wisdom is that what is in London’s interest is 
necessarily in the nation’s interest. It is certainly the case that much of national 
policy – such as fiscal and monetary policy, infrastructural policy, welfare 
spending, and so on - are determined in London. But the fact is the bulk the UK 
economy, in terms of production and employment, is located outside London and 
the surrounding South East.   Of course, every nation has a capital city, and in 
many cases the capital contains key national institutions. But in few other 
 11 
advanced countries does the national capital exert such dominance and influence 
as does London over the rest of the UK.  
 
Spatially rebalancing the UK economy is not just about (yet) another round of 
spatially-focused policy programmes and initiatives seeking to promote the 
advantages of agglomeration in cities outside London, better co-coordinating 
economic and spatial planning between the constituent parts of the UK, boosting 
innovation in the regions, or improving the infrastructures of city-regions 
outside the south of England, necessary and important though such 
interventions might be (see, for example, Bailey, Hildreth, and de Propris, 2015). 
At this potentially decisive moment, the need is for more fundamental change, 
about the need to undertake a long-overdue spatial rebalancing of the nation’s 
institutional and governance architectures.  
 
To put the issue simply, the time has come in the UK to spatially decentre the 
power structures that drive and manage economic growth and development.   
Unless we have a greater spatial balance in those structures, the national 
economy itself will remain spatially unbalanced. The solution, we suggest, is a 
much-needed introduction of a federated or semi-federated model of economic 
and fiscal governance.  Some version of regional or city-regional federalism is 
increasingly the norm in almost all other western advanced economies.  Many 
European countries moved in this direction from the 1980s onwards (Harvie, 
1994).  Although the UK has moved down the path of devolved powers for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and London since the late 1990s, it has 
failed to develop the kind of institutionalised frameworks used in federal 
systems (e.g. Austria, Germany, Switzerland) or countries with devolved systems 
of government (e.g. Italy, Spain) to coordinate policy objectives and instruments 
for territorial balance across the constituent parts of the nation.5 Further, the 
devolution process involving Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales has failed to 
attenuate the highly centralised fiscal and governance structure in England.   
 
However, an historic and potentially formative opportunity is opening up, 
especially in the wake of the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Further 
constitutional change in Scotland, with the promise of more devolution of fiscal 
and policy powers, has been initiated by the Smith Commission, and new powers 
have been announced for Wales. Changes discussed for Scotland include enabling 
the Scottish Parliament to be responsible for raising around 40% of Scottish 
taxes and allocating around 60% of its spending. This devolutionary moment has 
                                                        
5 Examples of such frameworks include the Federal-State Joint Task ‘Improvement of Regional 
Economic Structure’ (Germany), the standing Spatial Development Coordination Conference 
(Austria), and the Federal-Canton coordination functions of the State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (Switzerland). 
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encouraged new thinking in England about moving beyond the ad hoc and 
piecemeal approach to decentralisation and the increasing plethora of largely 
uncoordinated local and city-based initiatives introduced in recent years (such 
as the LEPs, the Local Growth Fund, the new Enterprise Zones, the City Deals, 
Devolution Deals, etc.) towards a new spatially devolved model of economic 
development. Already in 2012 Lord Heseltine had argued for the devolution £49 
billion of central Government spending each year. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’s idea of stimulating a ‘northern powerhouse’ based on the ‘super 
metro-region’ of Liverpool-Manchester-Leeds-Sheffield has itself stimulated a 
call for ‘metro-devo’ not only by Greater Manchester, but also by other city-
regional and/or county groupings. Indeed, government received 38 proposals for 
further decentralisation (including 4 from Scotland and Wales) in its latest round 
of devolution deal-making (O’Brien and Pike 2015).   The Cities and Local 
Government Devolution Bill provides some indication of the Government’s 
proposed direction of travel providing enabling legislation for the devolution of 
powers to city-regions with elected metro-mayors.  Cities will have increased 
powers over areas including housing, transport, and strategic planning but it is 
not yet clear what all this will actually add up to in making an effective 
contribution to spatial economic re-balancing across England.  
 
Together, current developments suggest that the possibility of constructing a 
new spatially devolved model of political-economic governance within the UK 
may be emerging.   However, at the present time, while these are steps in the 
right direction, this movement has the hallmarks of relatively ad hoc and 
piecemeal reform, in which some constituent nations, regions and cities areas 
will be granted certain devolved powers while others will not – a highly uneven, 
unequal and potentially unstable and divisive settlement that may do more to 
promote further spatial imbalance rather than work towards ameliorating it. 
Places with weaker economies, tax bases and prospects will be rendered fiscally 
exposed and vulnerable without appropriate safeguards and equalisation 
mechanisms. We could all too easily end up with a geographically chaotic and 
divisive system, an outcome unfortunately all too characteristic of the tradition 
of ‘muddling through’ in how policy initiatives and reforms tend to be managed 
in the UK.  Rather, what is called for is a coherent and comprehensive UK-wide 
strategy and long-term plan for addressing spatial imbalances that recognises 
the new constitutional realities with respect to the Devolved Administrations, 
and which offers meaningful and appropriately resourced decentralisation to 
regions or city-regions in England within an overall federal territorial structure 
that covers the whole of the UK.   
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Our purpose here is not to set out the precise and elaborate details of such a 
new spatial political economy. Such issues require wider social deliberation 
perhaps through a national constitutional convention for the UK. Rather, our 
focus is some of the foundational issues, or building blocks, in relation to such a 
structure, namely: institutionalising spatial economic balance as a policy 
objective, decentralizing and devolving governance, decentralizing public 
administration, fiscal devolution, decentralising the financial system, and 
establishing a national regionally-organized investment bank. 
 
INSTITUTIONALISING SPATIAL ECONOMIC BALANCE AS A 
POLICY OBJECTIVE 
 
 For too long the notion of what constitutes ‘regional (and indeed ‘urban’) 
policy has been restricted to the system of officially-designated and specifically 
spatially-targeted interventions and expenditures. In reality, almost every 
government policy and form of government expenditure, although 
ostensibly ’non-spatial’, has impacts and repercussions that vary from region to 
region.  As mentioned above, these ‘national’ policies can even act as ‘counter-
regional’ policies, favouring already prosperous regions and cities over less 
prosperous ones. Given variations in economic structure and competitiveness 
between the UK regions, for example, there is no form of monetary policy or 
fiscal policy or government expenditure that is spatially neutral in its effects.  
Whether it be reductions in the higher rates of income tax, changes in the Bank 
Rate (for example in response to inflation), cuts in public expenditure (such as 
reductions in the central government grant to local authorities), or new spending 
on infrastructure, the impact on economic growth, jobs, and incomes, can be 
expected to vary from region to region. The positive or negative multiplier 
effects of increases or reductions in government spending do not fall equally 
across space.  However, these varying impacts are rarely taken into account in 
the design or implementation of national policies.  Put another way, there is a 
lack of explicit appraisal of what the regional impacts of major spending (or 
austerity) programmes and policies might be.  
 
As one example, it is well known that geographically concentrated and 
imbalanced regional development can impart an inflationary bias to the national 
economy, and thus limit the scope and impact of macro-economic management. 
London is arguably the most inflation-prone region in the UK, in terms of office 
rents, housing costs and wages.  The last three house-price bubbles have started 
there and then diffused outwards across the regions.  Monetary measures taken 
to dampen such ‘national’ inflation waves, such as raising the interest rate, while 
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perhaps justifiable and helpful in terms of controlling inflation in the London-
South East region, may in fact be quite damaging to economic activity in the 
North of the country.  This was the concern in 1998 when the then Governor of 
the Bank of England, Eddie George, provoked complaint when he stated that “job 
losses in the North were an acceptable price to pay for curbing inflation in the 
south”.  He went on to add that while rising unemployment in the north east was 
undesirable “monetary policy can only target the economy as a whole, not 
particular regions or sectors, however uncomfortable that reality might be” (BBC 
News, November 5, 1998).  If there is an argument for a more spatially balanced 
economy, this must surely be a leading contender. 
 
What has long been missing in national policy making is a ‘spatial literacy’ that 
attempts to recognise what the regional impacts of a given national economic 
policy are likely to be, and whether and to what extent that policy can be 
designed in a way that minimises any adverse or negative impact on the less 
prosperous regions.  In other words, there is a strong case for institutionalising 
the goal of spatial economic balance within national policymaking, not as some 
ad hoc add-on, but as an integral component of such policy making. This in turn 
implies the coordination, wherever possible, of central government national 
policies and expenditures with one another and with those other measures 
explicitly targeted to individual regions and cities as part of the rebalancing 
effort, and using national policies and public investment programmes to help 
secure spatial balance across the national economy.  
 
A typical case in point is national physical (and soft) infrastructure, 
particularly as it relates to connectivity. It is widely recognised that modern and 
efficient public infrastructure is key to economic growth and competitiveness, 
regionally and nationally, and there is increasing political debate over the need 
to improve and extend transport links between the regions and between the 
cities of the UK .  This is well illustrated in relation to access to good quality air 
connections.  And yet, as the recent National Task Force on Connectivity (NTFC, 
2015) has shown most clearly increased constraints on runway capacity over the 
last twenty years has led to domestic services from the UK’s regions being 
displaced from Heathrow to Gatwick and other London airports (There are only 
7 UK domestic routes left to and from Heathrow compared to the 17 that 
operated in the late 1980s). The loss of connectivity to the international hub of 
Heathrow has impacted negatively on the competiveness of businesses outside 
the South of the United Kingdom. As Lord Shipley remarks in the Forward to the 
NTCF Report: 
 
A policy of non-intervention has for twenty years led to the prioritisation of 
international air access over domestic services at Gatwick and Heathrow. 
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This policy can no longer be defended when from the middle of the next 
decade there could be in excess of 250,000 additional take-off and landing 
slots to be released as a result of a new runway being opened. As we seek 
to rebalance the country’s economy and generate real and lasting growth, 
domestic air connectivity to and through London and the South East 
matters greatly. The rest of the UK should no longer be required to rely so 
heavily on overseas hubs for global connectivity. The UK needs to be able to 
meet its own strategic infrastructure needs if it is to be able to compete 
globally’ (Lord Shipley, 2015). 
 
As another example, the proposal to build a new high-speed rail link 
between London and Birmingham, and eventually to Manchester and Leeds (so-
called HighSpeed 2), at a possible cost of £50billion or more, has attracted  
criticism from not only other cities that the proposed new rail link will by-pass 
and it’s lack of connections to such cities but also from other cities in the North 
and North East which lack a much needed modern and efficient east-west link. At 
the same time, the Government has frozen part of its £38.5billion five-year 
upgrade to major rail lines in the Midlands and North of England, which hardly 
squares with its campaign to rebalance the country and create a ‘northern 
powerhouse”.6  The problem is that there appears to be no co-ordinated thinking 
in Government transport infrastructure planning, and certainly a lack of ensuring 
that major public investments of this kind link to and are consistent with 
rebalancing objectives. 
 
There is knowledge, experience and models in other countries that can 
inform how the UK might think about, adapt and develop a more coordinated 
approach to delivering its national objectives not just on public investment, but 
also other major expenditure areas such as education, training, research and 
development and so on, in order to better achieve the objectives of spatial 
rebalancing.  Recognising the particular variegations and historical geographies 
of national political economies that would need learning from and adapting for 
the UK situation, an example of a formal system that goes some way to achieve 
such coordination is the Joint Task ‘Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structures’ in Germany (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen 
Wirtschaftsstruktur). This brings together the Federal Government and regional 
state (land) governments to set out an annual framework plan, with a calibrated 
voting system to ensure consensus across the levels of government. A more 
informal model is the Austrian ‘Spatial Planning and Development Conference’ 
(Österreiche Raumordnungskonferenz) that coordinates national strategies and 
the territorial development interests of different levels on a voluntary basis. 
More generally, there are lessons from countries like Norway which produces a 
                                                        
6 See http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/25/network-rail-chief-to-step-down-as-
385bn-upgrades-are-delayed 
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White Paper for each new government – based on extensive research, evaluation 
and analysis – on the state of regional disparities and the priorities for regional 
and local development across the country.  While there does appear to be a 
welcome recognition of the importance of spatial rebalancing as a foundation for 
national growth and prosperity emerging across major Government departments 
– most recently by the UK Treasury (2015) – this needs to be explicitly 
institutionalised and coordinated as a key objective within departmental 
spending and policy programmes, and those programmes should themselves be 
consistent with the development needs of the regions.   
 
DECENTRALISING AND DEVOLVING GOVERNANCE IN ENGLAND 
Besides the need to institutionalise spatial economic balance within the 
policy machinery of national government, there is also scope for further 
decentralising  certain sections and functions of central government and the civil 
service from Whitehall in London to other parts of the UK.  Decentralisation not 
only reduces costs, it increases Whitehall’s spatial awareness, and increases the 
connection of central government with the regions (Smith, 2010). Echoing calls 
from just over a decade ago (Massey et al, 2003), a new round of public sector 
dispersal is warranted, and would reinforce the broader decentralization of 
governance advocated below.  The same principles should govern an assessment 
of decentralization of public administration within Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The asymmetrical and uneven nature of governance arrangements in the 
UK is acute. Enhanced decentralisation of the UK’s centralised governance 
system in England could provide the greater powers, freedoms, flexibilities, 
resources and fiscal capacity required to enable meaningful decisions to be made 
and funded at appropriate scales. Some kind of road map for decentralisation in 
the UK would be beneficial to the spatial rebalancing agenda. The road map 
could outline the vision, direction and speed of travel and address the limitations 
of the current ad hoc, piecemeal and uneven deal-based approach. The current 
approach has created uncertainty, generated short-term demands for 
governance bodies and partners to articulate their propositions, underpinned 
perpetual reorganisation and only modestly begun to change the structures and 
cultures of centralisation ingrained in the UK political economy. Moreover, the 
democratic and political accountability of emergent governance arrangements 
remains under-developed and appears to have learned little from the public 
rejection of the elected regional assemblies with limited powers and resources in 
2004 (Rallings and Thrasher 2006). While there is some consensus on the 
failings of the centralised governance system in England, there is much less 
agreement and clarity on what should replace it. Any new road map charting a 
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course through these thorny issues could build upon the UK House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s current enquiry into the future 
of devolution in the UK in the wake of the Scottish independence referendum 
result and the revived interest in a federal UK (Blick and Jones, 2010).  
 
A basic question, of course, concerns the most appropriate geographical 
basis for such devolution or decentralisation. The history of economic 
governance in England is one of “compulsive re-organisation” (Jones 2010: 374) 
and “perpetual restructuring” (Mulgan 2010: 1) as repeated institutional 
experiments have tried to address the “missing middle” (Shaw and Greenhalgh 
2010: 457) between central and local government. Building on the regional 
planning system established in the late 1940s, this process resembles a 
pendulum oscillating in the post-war period between the regional (early 1960s), 
local (c. 1979-1994), regional (1997-2010) and local (2010-) scales (Pike, et al, 
2015). Ideally, the spatial units should be functional economic regions, but 
practically would need to be built up from existing administrative areas.  The 
former eight English Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), which were based 
on Government Office Regions, were abolished by the Coalition Government 
partly on the very grounds that they did not represent meaningful economic 
units, were too large and unaccountable (Pike, et al., 2014). The thirty-nine Local 
Enterprise Partnerships, based on groupings of local authority districts, that 
have been established in place of the RDAs as the basis for the Government’s 
Local Growth Agenda, are supposed to be more meaningful in economic terms. 
But many of the LEPs are no more functionally meaningful than the former RDAs, 
many are somewhat arbitrary alliances, several of them overlap, and many are 
too small (Pike et al. 2015).  An alternative approach is to think in terms of city-
regions, or what in most cases would be regional groupings (systems) of 
interconnected cities and their surrounding hinterlands.  The emerging ‘metro-
region’ of Liverpool-Manchester-Leeds-Sheffield may well be one such. But the 
challenge is to partition the whole of the UK into economically meaningful city-
regions and associated hinterland areas. The City Growth Commission (2014) has 
identified some 15 major cities across the UK that could be the cores or joint 
cores of surrounding linked regions for governance, fiscal and economic policy 
purposes. But this proposal would leave much of the East of England and South 
West regions without such units.  What is needed is a thorough-going enquiry 
into how best to define and delineate a nation-wide system of city-regional and 
county-regional areas that could function as a devolved governance structure 
able to build capacity to govern and capable of controlling total local public 
spending, with legal powers to enact joined-up government, power over local 
property taxes, and powers to reinvest proceeds and savings locally. Such city-
regions and county-regions should be democratically constituted, and able to 
formulate their particular governance structures, for example elected mayors 
and assemblies, rather than having the imposed from the national centre. 
Marrying bottom-up and top-down institutional reforms, such functional 
 18 
economic groupings will need to be articulated with the emergent administrative 
map of local authority collaborations emerging across England (Paine and 
Smulian 2015). 
 
 
FISCAL DEVOLUTION 
 
As the UK has sought to come to terms with the spatial consequences of 
its industrial decline much has been learned about how to enhance the rate of 
local economic growth. Local areas start with an inherited pattern of land use 
and a resource base and institutions that were tailored to another era. The legacy 
of the past can weigh heavily, and adapting to new futures can be difficult.  In the 
last thirty years, the challenge in many areas has been to bring about economic, 
physical and economic and social renewal and reorientation against a backdrop 
where much of their existing stock of floorspace, human and physical capital was 
configured to produce goods that either no longer exist or are now made 
elsewhere in the world (Baxter, et al, 2007). In order to achieve such renewal 
and re-orientation, sustained and substantial effort on several fronts is required, 
including the promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation, investment, and 
human capital formation (education and skills) and infrastructure modernisation 
(Gardiner, et al, 2013).  
 
At the present time local growth initiatives across the United Kingdom are 
struggling to gain traction given the scale of the task of economic transformation 
and adaptation. New ways have to be found to increase the level of resources 
that can be levered into or retained and pooled to help promote the local growth 
process and thus speed up the pace at which change can occur. Local authorities 
in particular are very constrained in their ability to obtain the resources they 
need in a highly centralised public finance system dominated by pooling and 
transfers to the local level from the national centre and characterised by the 
historical accretion of complex political and institutional accommodations and 
fixes such as the Barnett Formula.  Most of the resources that they receive are 
hypothecated and allocated on a population basis. UK government departments 
in Whitehall and the Devolved Administrations still tend to influence and control 
key decisions in relation to mainstream budgets in the areas of skills, health, 
housing, business support, and much more.  
 
While the international evidence on the relationships between 
decentralisation and regional growth is mixed and shaped by the nature and 
forms of decentralised governance arrangements (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 
2013, Tomaney, et al, 2011), fiscal capacity and powers are seen as critically 
important. In the UK the proportion of tax set at the local level in the United 
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Kingdom is equivalent to 1.7% of GDP (Parliament UK, 2014).  This compares to 
15.9% in Sweden, 15.3% in Canada, 10.9% in Germany, and 5.8% in France. In 
addition, the proportion of tax revenues to local government as a proportion of 
total national tax revenue has actually been falling for forty years, from just over 
11% in 1975 to 4.9% in 2012 (OECD, 2015).  The UK is out of line with most 
other comparable OECD countries where, if anything, the proportion has either 
remained broadly the same or increased, sometimes quite dramatically as in the 
case of Italy and France, through meaningful fiscal decentralisation (see Table 4).  
 
  
Table 4:  Attribution of Tax Revenue to Local and Regional Government as a 
Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
  
Country  1975 1995 2012 
 
United States 34.2 33.1 35.8 
Spain 4.3 13.3 42.1 
Denmark 30.4 31.9 26.9 
France 7.6 11.0 13.2 
Italy 0.9 5.4 16.4 
Japan 25.6 25.3 24.7 
Germany 31.3 29.0 39.8 
United Kingdom 11.1 3.7 4.9 
Source: OECD (2015) Tax Policy Analysis. 
  
 In the face of a severe lack of resources in comparison with other 
countries and faced with the need to address considerable changes to their 
physical fabric and labour markets, local authorities across the United Kingdom 
have been forced to rely on relatively inadequate discretionary resources – 
either from UK government in England, or the Devolved Administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - to deliver their local growth agendas 
and/or work with central government bodies such as the Homes and 
Communities Agency. They have often had to apply for packages of support from 
central government that have usually been made available through specific 
policy initiatives like City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget. In other 
cases, central government has made funding available through initiatives such as 
Development Corporations and Enterprise Zones.  
 
 More recently, City Deals have reflected the same process except the UK 
government has increasingly sought to ensure that specific targets are met, 
which has further added to the difficulties and complexities that local authorities 
face in securing funds (O’Brien and Pike 2015). While the Devolved 
Administrations have established strategic economic development frameworks, 
in England the allocation of resources most recently to Local Enterprise 
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Partnerships as part of the Growth Deals reflects much the same process.  What 
now exists is a plethora of piecemeal, largely unconnected forms of centralized 
support (mostly allocated locally on a competitive basis), that do not add up to a 
systematic, sufficiently-funded or coherent strategy for spatially rebalancing the 
economy– a situation recognized by the National Audit Office (2014).  
 
 It was in recognition of this overly-centralized and under-resourced state 
of affairs, that Lord Heseltine (2012) identified some £49 billion of central 
government spending on skills, infrastructure, employment, housing, 
regeneration and business support, that he considered could and should be 
devolved directly to city-regions. While the Government accepted most of 
Heseltine’s recommendations (HM Treasury, 2013)7 and in response set up the 
Local Growth Fund, the scale of resources committed is only just over £2billion.  
More important is its pledge to bring the total resources under the strategic 
control of the Local Enterprise Partnerships to £20billion by 2021 HM Treasury, 
2013). This commitment would certainly be a significant move towards fiscal 
devolution. But it would still fall far short of the scale required.  It is not just a 
case of devolving control over certain areas of central government spending to 
the city regions, but also one of permitting such areas to retain their local 
receipts from property taxes, business taxes and local services. Greater 
Manchester alone estimates its receipts to be around £17billion per annum. And 
it is far from clear that the system of LEPs is necessarily the most appropriate 
spatial governance structure through which to achieve this goal.  As stated above, 
many LEPS are not economically meaningful units, nor are they directly 
accountable as such to local electorates.  Yet, as the Government stresses, the 
issue of local governance is key to the devolution of fiscal resources.  
 Thus while there is a welcome emerging recognition of the case for a less 
centralized and better integrated system of public finances in the UK, this 
historical opportunity needs to be pursued with greater commitment and 
coherence of purpose.  Accountability, transparency and clarity to better connect 
where money is raised and spent, where this is decided and how it can be used to 
stimulate and incentivise sustainable growth and development are critical. 
Equalisation and safety net principles need to be retained too in the context of 
further decentralisation and localization of the governance and fiscal system. 
Such reforms may risk opening up further spatial imbalances and fiscal 
disparities between more and less prosperous places with stronger or weaker 
tax bases. The more vulnerable places with greater needs will require support to 
prevent their exposure and manage their vulnerability within any more 
decentralized system. 
                                                        
7 Specifically, 81 (in full or in part) of Heseltine’s 89 recommendations. 
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 Much work has already been done to explore the potential of these kinds 
of reforms. The Commission on the Future of Local Government (2012), for 
example, has called for greater devolution of powers and funding over the 
drivers of productivity, skills, transport and innovation as part of creating 
greater civic enterprise by local authorities. Working with the principal of fair 
outcomes across London and the country as well as the desire to render the 
governance of financial decision-making more accountable to residents and 
businesses in London, the London Finance Commission (2013) suggested the 
further devolution of fiscal powers including the increase of revenue streams 
under local control. These include property taxes and eventually the ‘full suite’ of 
council tax, business rates, stamp duty land tax, annual tax on enveloped 
dwellings and capital gains property disposal tax, and reduced restrictions on 
borrowing for investment. This same reasoning is no less applicable to other city 
regions across the country, although the highly uneven scale and strength of 
their tax bases will need to be recognised.  
 
 Concrete innovations for fiscal decentralisation across the UK would be 
meaningful progression of place-based settlements for local authority groupings 
that are multi-annual, multi-sectoral and provide the opportunity to integrate, 
connect and provide more certainty for longer-term utilisation and management 
of (national and local) public sector revenues and assets (Blond and Morrin, 
2014). Work on such place-based arrangements including ‘Total Place’ and 
‘Community Budgets’ has already explored the possibilities and reforms in this 
area and the Local Government Association (2015) has called for long-term and 
place-based finance as the default method of funding with appropriate 
flexibilities, freedoms and reforms built in (see also House of Commons 
Communities and Local Government, 2013). 
 
 
DECENTRALISING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
The overly centralized and concentrated financial system in the UK has 
long been recognized as a consistent and deeply entrenched cause of spatial 
imbalance within the UK. To compound the problem, UK banks have long ago 
shifted their lending activities away from industry, in favour of lending to other 
financial institutions and offering mortgage finance. Back in 1950, some 65 
percent of bank lending was to industry; by 2010 that had fallen to 15 percent. 
Over the same period, lending to financial companies has increased from 10 
percent to 38 percent, while mortgage lending, which was zero in 1950, 
accounted for 40 per cent of lending in 2010 (Bank of England, 2014).  Expressed 
another way, bank loans accounted for only 18 percent of industry financing in 
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the UK in 2010; this compares to a corresponding figure of 45 percent in 
Germany.  
 
The difficulties faced by small- and medium-sized firms in raising capital 
have been a topic of recurrent concern in the UK. The Government has made 
much of the need to stimulate advanced manufacturing, as part of its concern to 
rebalance the economy. Many specialist advanced manufacturing firms are small 
or medium sized.  Some targeted initiatives have been introduced to support 
SMEs such as the advanced manufacturing supply chain scheme, but the scale of 
funds committed (£213 million, see Department of Business Innovation and 
Skills (2013)) are able to make only a modest contribution to the task of 
rebuilding UK manufacturing.  If the UK government is serious about increasing 
its presence in advanced manufacturing, and increasing the productivity and 
export performance of manufacturing as a whole (HM Treasury, 2015), the 
funding of new investment is an issue that urgently needs to be addressed.  To 
this end, there would seem to be a very real opportunity to use the tax system in 
the UK to align the objective of more spatial rebalancing with that of more 
sectoral rebalancing. Government could establish new ‘Advanced Manufacturing 
Bonds’ with favourable tax treatment to increase the flow of funds into advanced 
manufacturing firms, some of which funds might be available as a result of recent 
changes to pensions. Many northern cities still have significant manufacturing 
potential and increased investment in this sector would assist them with their 
growth agendas.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence that the geographically skewed nature of the 
capital markets operates in a spatially biased way, creating funding and financing 
gaps especially for SMEs and firms in economically weaker and peripheral 
localities and regions. Globalization, technological innovation, competition and 
mergers and acquisitions have accentuated such centralization and 
concentration. The UK’s financial system is overwhelming concentrated in and 
controlled from London, and national monetary policy (such as interest rates) 
has tended to be biased towards the concerns of the capital’s financial nexus 
(Deutsche Bank, 2013). Experience from Germany suggests that a more 
regionally decentralized financial system is associated with a greater regional 
evenness in the allocation of funding to SMEs. The German banking system has a 
significant regional dimension and has traditionally had a close relationship with 
industry (Hutton, 1995). Likewise, the spatial organisation of the German 
venture capital market, involving several major centres, contrasts with the 
situation in the UK, where the venture capital industry is overwhelmingly 
concentrated in London and the surrounding South East (these two regions 
contain some 75 percent of the nation’s venture capital firms, and account for 
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over 60 percent of venture capital investment) (Martin, et al, 2005). Learning 
from and adapting the experiences of more decentralised systems such as 
Germany can provide a stimulus for innovation in the UK context.  
 
The uneven access to finance in the UK has prompted the Scottish 
Government to propose a Scottish Business Bank (replacing the Scottish 
Investment Bank within Scottish Enterprise) and there is a similar debate in 
Wales about replacing Finance Wales with a Development Bank for Wales. These 
debates, and emerging institutions, provide lessons for regionally focused 
investment institutions for other parts of the UK that would focus on raising 
funds for financing long-term productive assets and employment creation, 
especially in the areas of SMEs and infrastructure (Skidelsky, et al., 2011; 
Dolphin and Nash, 2012; Merlin-Jones, 2012; and Tott, 2012).8   Clearly there are 
issues to be resolved around what form such institutional arrangements might 
take, such as the remit of the bank, its capitalisation, how it might raise 
additional funds, its governance structure and potential hurdles to be overcome 
in setting it up, in particular gaining approval under the EU’s state aid rules. 
However, workable models exist elsewhere for example the German KfW, 
Finnvera in Finland and the US Small Business Administration.9  But what would 
be a crucial to any new banks remit would be the funding of SMEs in the regions 
outside London and the South East, given that these regions are already well 
served by the existing centralized financial system.  Regional lending data shows 
that SMEs in London have huge net positive deposit balances while in many 
other regions the reverse is the case.  New public investment banking 
arrangements in England would thus need to have a national and international 
reach married to an explicit regional structure to its organization in order to be 
close to the local SMEs seeking funding.  Such an institution would provide the 
sub-national focus that is missing for all parts of the UK, and could help ensure a 
more spatially balanced allocation of finance to private sector activity (Klagge, 
                                                        
8 In 2012, the Coalition Government established a national Green Investment Bank (GIB), with 
publicly funded capitalisation of £3.8billion, with a remit to invest in UK based green 
infrastructure in energy efficiency, waste and bioenergy, and offshore wind.  The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer has now announced his intention to privatise the GIB (along with several other 
public assets), to raise monies to reduce the national deficit, a move that has attrcated 
considerable criticism, including from with Government itself 
 (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/25/senior-tories-slam-governments-
green-investment-bank-sell-off. 
9 The German KfW is a state-owned bank with various functions, but its two main activities are 
financing housing and environmental projects, and providing funds for SMEs. It covers over 90 
percent of its borrowing needs in the capital markets, mainly through bonds that are guaranteed 
by the national government. This allows KfW to raise funds at advantageous conditions. Its 
exemption from having to pay corporate taxes due to its legal status as a public agency and 
unremunerated equity provided by its public shareholders allow KfW to provide loans for 
purposes prescribed by the KfW at lower rates than commercial banks. KfW is not allowed to 
compete with commercial banks, but it facilitates their business in areas within its mandate. 
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and Martin, 2005).  And as the German system demonstrates, a more spatially 
decentralized banking structure need not compromise the credit rating of the 
institutions concerned (Moody’s Investor Services, 2013).  
 
CONCLUSION: TIME FOR BOLD CHANGE 
Whether considered at the regional, local or urban scales, entrenched and 
persistent spatial disparities in economic and social conditions are a strategically 
important issue for all the major political parties in the UK.  The new UK 
Government has made much of the need to re-balance the geography of the UK 
economy (HM Treasury, 2015).  The growth gap between the South and the 
North (and indeed between most of the cities in the South and most of those in 
the North - see Martin et al, (2014)), is long-standing,  cumulative and systemic. 
The problem goes well beyond the economics of urban agglomeration and is 
rooted in the spatially biased nature of the national political economy (see also, 
Martin, 2015). It is time to start thinking about radical changes to that national 
political economy to ensure that the citizens of all the regions and cities of the 
United Kingdom can share in the opportunities and benefits of sustainable 
economic growth and development in the years ahead. Such decentralised 
systems may be better placed to deal with disruptive change and foster 
institutional and policy innovation to address economic, social and 
environmental development needs. We have outlined a number of such radical 
changes to the UK’s spatial political economy that are necessary if any 
substantial and lasting spatial rebalancing of the UK economy is to be secured.  
Calls were made over a decade ago for ‘decentering the nation’ (Massey, et al, 
2003), and, to date, only limited and modest progress has been made, especially 
in England. While recognising the difficulties and costs involved in such radical 
change, especially in a period of austerity, the current juncture is potentially 
more propitious politically for reviving that call (UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills, 2011; IPPR North, 2014). Our argument is that a 
decentralised framework, involving the meaningful extension of devolution in 
governance, public finance and the financial system, would not only connect to a 
growing groundswell of support for more decentralization and provide a boost 
to the prospects for more sustainable growth and development (City Growth 
Commission, 2015), but should form a key step towards a spatially federated 
structure for the UK.  Unless such a bold step is undertaken, the likelihood is that 
the issue of spatial imbalance will continue to challenge governments well into 
the future. 
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